Any fool looking at the map can see that Sharon's endgame was the permanent retention of huge chunks of the West Bank, together with considerable control over what had ostensibly been "given up" and with near-absolute ownership of Jerusalem. As for Gaza, I never forget what I was told by Ilan Halevi, one of the few Jews in the upper ranks of the PLO, when the swap was first mooted at Oslo. "I proposed we should tell the Israelis, OK, we accept Gaza. Now—what will you give us in return?" That terrible strip of isolation and misery is, in short, no bargain.

However, once a concession is made in principle, it is harder to resist in practice. There are, and always have been, only four alternatives in the Israeli-Palestinian quadrilateral. The first is the status quo of mingled apartheid and colonization that would eventually see the Israelis ruling without consent over a people as large as or larger than themselves and that is now almost universally seen as intolerable and unsustainable. The second is a state where those under its jurisdiction are equal citizens with the right to vote, which would be the end of Zionism. The third is the destruction or removal of one people by the other or their common ruin in a catastrophic war. The fourth is a partition between two separate states. All have their disadvantages, but the fourth appears to have the fewest and is supported officially by the PLO and endorsed by a probable majority of Israeli and diaspora Jews. For most of his career, Sharon supported the first option and conducted occasional flirtations with the expulsionist supporters of the third option. His conversion to the fourth may have taken unpleasing forms—a wall is a wall is a wall—but it did begin to acknowledge the contours of Palestinian statehood, and this counts as one of the better ironies of history

- What Sharon Did

well hard to imagine how the wall or 2 seperate states could ever work. This seems to me to definitely be a drastic form of apartheid! Economically I can't see either of them surviving on their own but in the long run would think the palestinians might have a better chance.

I assume once the seperate states are established then something like the soviet union regorganising with past participants might occur. I think the economic necessity will drive them together in the future and it may be that Israel is going to need the Palestinians more than the Palestinians will need Israel.

Will have to look at the economic figures for both but doubt if there is too much info on the palestinian state. If the palestiniians in the short term are just workers in israel and the majority of that state's income is from israel then that seems to me to be another form of aparthied.

U.S fininacial support has enabled subsidies to some Israeli industries as well as the military and I doubt if they will survive without it.  I think there is a chance that the palestinian state could form an economic alliance in the region but to the minute the strongest ally of Israel in the middle east has been Turkey and they seem to be moving away from this position. I think Israel is isolated at the minute and if the U.S. decides to ease out of the situation then they are in big trouble.

I think it may indeed be politically similar to the situation in algeria, and the soviet states but not economically. The 2 states will survive as does somalia sierra leone, liberia etc. I suppose what I am suggesting is the economic reality may just force the issue quicker than would have been the case. It will be obvious I think in the very near short term that Israel is not economically able to maintain the current conditions and subsequently needs to change. I am not aware of the strength of the opposition, but feel it will gain strength if or when the U.S. cuts the lifeline.

tomb: I'm still not clear what you are getting at. Rather than trying to unscramble it I'll just try to state my analysis of the situation very succinctly.

1. Nothing has changed recently. Dramatic events unfolding now actually happened several years ago. This is fundamental. My impression is that your reference to "the current conditions" is based on the prevailing illusions among pretty well all commentators and analysts (and declaratory policies of the actors).
2. Basic framework for what is unfolding (ie becoming visible) now was publicly announced more than 2 years ago in the Geneva Accord between "unofficial" representatives of PLO and main Zionist leadership. This agreement was not acceptable to large sections of public opinion on both sides and implementation therefore requires the same sort of process that ocurred when the US decided to get out of Vietnam (decision taken in 1968, Paris Agreement signed in 1972, Saigon not liberated until 1975 so that defeated side could claim "peace with honor" and successfully sustain the illusions that have left so many convinced the US is still a global hegemon rather than a declining "last superpower").
3. Actual decision was much earlier - with Sharon's "wall" being the critical announcement that indirectly told Israelis his lifelong dream of annexing the West Bank was impossible. The focus on how vicious that wall was for Palestinians helped distract from the more fundamental point that the Zionist dream of eliminating Palestine and ruling "judea and samaria" was over. The wall implied two sides and non-Israeli territory on the other side - ie a Palestinian state - while still holding out the illusion that they could keep whole of Jerusalem and substantial part of West Bank and expressing a determination to beat Palestinians into submission. Bush's total endorsement of Sharon's macho and bloody posturing against "Palestinian terrorism" helped distract attention from what would otherwise have been universally recognized as a major defeat for previous US policy in having to support a Palestinian State. (eg Shout a lot at Arafat while describing co-founder of Fateh, Abu Mazen as friend). Even most of the die hard Zionists now more or less believe their own propaganda that they were always fighting for end to "Palestinian terrorism" rather than for conquest. They will accept "success" when they achieve that by allowing viable Palestinian state in the same way that Nixon convinced Americans the US goal in Vietnam had always been "peace with honor" by forcing those recalcitrant Vietnamese to allow them to leave with all the POWs (easily achieved by allowing Saigon to become Ho Chi Minh City).
4. Implementation has already begun. "Unilateral" withdrawal from Gaza was presented as tightening perimeter for viable borders (including as much as possible of West Bank). But inclusion of some (small and unimportant) West Bank settlements made it clear to die hards that they would have to make an all out stand with threats of civil war etc. They did and got nowhere (since few Israelis actually give a shit about Gaza which was presented as the main issue). So now Israeli opinion has been fully prepared for further evacuation of West Bank (though still bewildered about East Jerusalem).
5. At same time, Hamas has effectively joined the PLO and thus tacitly accepted a two state solution by contesting elections and other significant internal changes have occurred on Palestinian side.
6. All this has been done without triggering a major confrontation with zionist lobby in US and public opinion in US is now overwhelmingly in favor of a Palestinian state with opposition largely confined to fringe Zionists (both jewish and Christian loonies) and not even majority of jewish community (cf previous situation where Clinton could not even use the words "Palestinian State").
7. Israel was originally an (expensive) US "strategic asset" in a regional policy now regarded as having been totally counterproductive for many decades. Has been a "strategic liability" for several decades and was openly described as a strategic liability in policy documents since the Kuwait war (see Khalizad's transition documents for incoming Bush administration). More recently described as "albatross" by Wolfowitz - its something US is stuck with rather than encouraging.
8. Any Israeli government has no choice but to adapt to changed US policy since it is financially dependent (though not a simple puppet regime like south Vietnam) and US has no choice but to ensure viable Palestinian and Israeli states or it cannot hope to drain the swamps.
9. Consequently Israel cannot continue policy of strangling Palestinian economic development and US is stuck with ensuring both are economically viable.
10. Expect lots of shouting and maneuvers but the overall direction has been clear for several years and is irreversible.
11. Longer term expect ongoing situation like Northern Ireland "troubles" since the US still hasn't really bitten the bullet and Zionist rule will remain within 1967 borders. But the (much less severe) oppression of Palestinian minority within 1967 borders of israel isn't as big a problem as for example the ongoing disaster in Africa. Enough is being done to ensure the region can transition successfully and that's all that's essential at the moment just as Irish Free State was all that was essential after first world war while leaving future problem in Ulster. Zionist dream within 1967 borders is no more viable long term than Apartheid in south Africa or loyalist ascendancy in Ulster.
12. With that background perspective I don't see that precise economic details are very relevant. Both Eire and Ulster progressed economically and are well on the way towards a democratic solution.
13. Returning to point 1, there is something deeply faulty about the way people follow "current events" instead of analysing what is real and rational. Things that are necessary have essentially already happened. Dialectical strategic thinking should focus on the underlying logic of necessity and not get distracted by the "shouting". This is summarized in popular expression "It's all over bar the shouting".

Q:  Well, why is our perception so bad in the Muslim world then if you look at – since the invasion and occupation most surveys in the Muslim world show opinions of the United States have gone way down.  Why is that? 

 
SEC. WOLFOWITZ:  I don’t think I can explain it.  I think it is complicated.  I do think that some of it is an inevitable result of being at war.  War is an ugly business and it produces civilian casualties.  It, unfortunately, produces abuses like Abu Ghraib.  You know, it will look different in five years.  Think about – I pick five years not quite randomly.  We certainly didn’t look in Europe or Japan as though we were out of woods a year and half after the end of those wars.  And this war isn’t over yet.  The Marshall plan, as you remember, was three years after VE Day and it was a kind of desperate attempt to save a failing situation.  By that standard, we’re doing better.  So the test of this has to come with time, not – I wouldn’t argue that right now we’re sitting pretty.  Right now we’re in a very difficult position.  But – and part of the problem has nothing to do with what we do and a lot to do with the poison that’s fed into the Arab media by Al Jazeera, by some official media.  Part of it has to do with the Arab-Israeli issue which is unquestionably an albatross around our necks.

I will repeat what I said, perhaps glancingly earlier, I think making progress on the Arab-Israeli issue is one of those fronts.  And it’s a discouraging tough job.  I do think the fact that Shimon Peres isn’t attending here is a good signthat Ariel Sharon has embraced the policy of withdrawal from Gaza that his opponent embraced in the election.  It’s not the solution to the problem, but it would be a major step forward, I think, where we need to work on it

Q:  Thank you.  My name is Farida Aladi.  I’m from Libya.  I’m sorry, Mr. Wolfowitz, the past is not the past.  The past led to the present.  And part of the reason that we as Arabs in the region are perplexed and angry to the American policy in our region is that, indeed, you supported Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan.  You trained him.  He was able to open his eyes and to build his capacities that has led to what has led.  You supported Saddam Hussein against Iran when we were opposing Saddam Hussein.  You didn’t speak about the violations of human rights when he was violating human rights.  You supported the dictatorship in the Arab region and you called them your friends.  And for the last 30 years because of these regimes, we have been losers on many, many fronts.  So the past is not the past.  

 
And I hope that the new changes of your policy is, indeed, a genuine one and it’s not only a tactful one for your personal agenda.  I think we as Arab people would respect very much if you are very honest about your stance in the region.  Say you are a superpower, you are.  Say you have a strategic interest in our region, you are.  You need the oil, you need many other things, but I’m afraid to tell younone of the Arabs believe that you are there to bring democracy or human rights.  We still have on daily basis lots of human rights violation by rules and by governments that you call them your friend.  And as mother, as a woman, the war devastated us. 

 
Q:  Why don’t we let the secretary respond to that because it is a future-looking question, as well, about supporting regimes whose policies we may not agree with. 

 
SEC. WOLFOWITZ:  I wasn’t at all dismissive of the mistakes of the past.  Don’t misunderstand me.  I said I don’t think because we made mistakes in the past that we should continue to make those mistakes.  I think we need a fundamental change.  The president called for a fundamental change.  I believe we’re working toward that.  And I think one of the terrible shames on everybody in the past, not just the United States, was the willingness by so many people – Arabs as well as American officials – to look the other way at Saddam’s crimes.  I think it was terrible and particularly, that it continued after that war ended.  And I think it was terrible.  And I think frankly right now I’d like to see us standing up a little more strongly for people like Fatil Jakmi (sp) in Libya – your country – who was freed by Qaddafi and it was a great step forward and he’s been thrown back in jail again.  I think we should keep the pressure up for people like that.  We can’t change everything overnight. I don’t believe if the implication is that we shouldn’t have tried to get the Soviets out of Afghanistan, that the Afghans would be better off if the Soviet Union were still there.  I don’t buy that. 

 
I think after the Soviets left, we kind of walked away from our responsibility for 10 years and we paid a big price for that.  I would agree with that.  I don’t think the implication of what you’re saying and I don’t think you would mean it, is that we should have left Saddam Hussein in power.  Yes, we have strategic interests, yes, the oil of the Middle East is incredibly important.  But frankly, our only interest is that it be sold.  And if the people to whom it belongs own it, they’re going to sell it. 

 
We didn’t go to Iraq to take Iraq’s oil.  We went to Iraq to eliminate a man who was a great danger to the world and a terrible, terrible torture and abuser and rapist to the Iraqi people and I don’t apologize for that.