Some random notes.
Wapo's
Dan Froomkin drew attention to the fundamental incoherence I predicted arising from the need for declaratory policy to
threaten the Shia with prospects of the US pulling out if they don't accommodate the Sunnis.
There is, for instance, an irresolvable contradiction between Bush's insistence on the necessity of winning, because the alternative is cataclysmic, and his demand that the Iraqi government meet certain benchmarks, or else.
What does he mean by or else? He won't say.
This piece in Slate from
Dickerson almost shows some insight:
Perhaps the most puzzling assertion during this briefing was that U.S. domestic political pressure will budge Maliki. The Iraqis are "not oblivious to what is going on on Capitol Hill and the kinds of statements that you've been hearing from Leader Pelosi and others," said the official, referring to threats to begin removing troops. Suddenly, threats to withdraw are a good thing because they'll
focus Maliki's mind. Isn't that exactly what Democrats have been
promising the threat of a troop withdrawal would do?
Actually it's not that puzzling. The opposition has managed to enable Bush to sound a lot more coherent than I expected by sticking their necks out for a defeatist position instead of going for the Baker Commission "bipartisanship". Where Baker offered bipartisan incoherence, Bush has been able to express partisan clarity while delegating the job of threatening the Shia with the prospect of withdrawal to his opponents.
Thus US declaratory policy reflects a more positive "good cop/bad cop" incoherence with unpopularity of Bush's commitment providing a far more convincing threat of the prospect of US withdrawal if the Shia parties refuse the needed realignment, than anything incoherent that Bush could say about it while simultaneously expressing resolution, commitment and determination.
Symbolic resolutions denouncing the surge while voting the funds for it are unlikely to placate the Democrat base and will convey to all factions in Iraq both that US commitment for the next 2 years is certain, and that its continuation after that is dependent on national reconciliation being achieved during those 2 years.
Since the good and bad cops are not actually colluding, this looks like an extremely risky strategy given that actual withdrawal would be catastrophic. In principle this strategy could result in an anti-war Democrat candidate being elected and pulling out in 2009 if things have not turned around in Iraq by then.
In practice however, failure of realignment in Iraq would highlight the catastrophic consequences of withdrawal and result in a Democrat split and consequent defeat for the anti-war Democrat candidate.
So even the worst case would just result in the war being prolonged rather than defeat.
More likely, with successful realignment and some real progress, the Democrats would run a candidate like Hilary opposed to accepting defeat. Republicans would still be likely to win as a result of the Democrat carping having continued destructively during the 2 years, but even if Democrats did win, it would not result in defeat.
Meanwhile the recent personnel shuffle could be preparation for Condi to replace Cheney as VP at an appropriate time and then to be well positioned to become the Republican candidate for President (or at the very least, Vice President).
As far as I can make out, things are still looking good for realignment in the short term, with hard-line Sunni leader Vice-President
Hashimi begging the US to stay, and the Maliki government
announcing that Sadr has accepted that his militia will be disarmed.
Forums
Main Forum
